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Abstract: The special class of conservative charge systems for minimum
cost spanning tree (mcst) situations is introduced. These conservative charge
systems lead to single-valued rules for mcst situations, which can also be
described with the aid of obligation functions and are, consequently, cost
monotonic. A value-theoretic interpretation of these rules is also provided.




A minimum cost spanning tree (mcst) situation arises when there is a group
of agents N = f1;2;:::;ng who all want to be connected with a source 0,
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1directly or via other agents, and where connections are costly. To such mcst
situations correspond two problems: to construct a minimum cost spanning
tree (mcst) which connects all the agents with the source and to divide the
cost of constructing an mcst among the agents.
To construct an mcst two methods are mainly used: the Prim algorithm
(Prim (1957)) and the Kruskal algorithm (Kruskal (1956)). Both algorithms
determine an mcst forming, in every step of the algorithm, exactly one edge,
for a total number of steps equal to n. To divide the cost of an mcst among
the agents, both algorithms are suitable to deﬁne cost allocation protocols
which charge the agents with “fractions” of the cost of each edge constructed
in each step of the procedure.
Construct and Charge rules, formally introduced in Section 4, rely on this
idea of allocation protocol.
In this paper the Kruskal algorithm is central. This algorithm works
in the following way: in the ﬁrst step an edge between nodes in N [ f0g of
minimal cost is formed. In every subsequent step, a new edge of minimal cost
is formed, under the constraint that no cycles are formed. In summary, given
an ordering of the edges with respect to their increasing costs, a sequence of
edges is produced and after n steps an mcst appears.
In Feltkamp et al. (1994a,b), Norde et al. (2004), Branzei et al. (2004)
and Tijs et al. (2004) particular allocation protocols based on the Kruskal
algorithm are studied. Recently, we have discovered that we can embed all
such allocation protocols on mcst situations in a larger class of Construct
and Charge rules.
An interesting property of Construct and Charge rules is that some of
them are independent from the ordering of the edges with respect to their
increasing costs and some others not. For example, the Proportional rule
introduced in Feltkamp et al. (1994b) is dependent on the feasible orderings
of the edges with respect to increasing costs. The ERO-rule introduced in
Feltkamp et al. (1994a,b), which has been rebaptized as the P-value (Branzei
et al.(2004)), the P ¿-values (Norde et al. (2004), Branzei et al. (2004)) and
2the Obligation rules (Tijs et al. (2004)) do not depend on the orderings of
the edges with respect to increasing costs.
The aim of this paper is to introduce and characterize the class of Con-
struct and Charge rules whose particular elements are “conservative”. For
such conservative Construct and Charge rules it turns out that diﬀerent
feasible orders of the edges (w.r.t. increasing costs) lead to the same cost
allocations. Moreover, it turns out that conservative Construct and Charge
rules are Obligation rules (Tijs et al. (2004)).
We start introducing some basic notions in the next section. In Section
3 the deﬁnition of a charge system is introduced, speciﬁc examples are given
and some basic properties, like the conservativeness property for charge sys-
tems and a related concept of potential, are studied. Based on charge systems
and orderings of the edges with respect to increasing costs, the deﬁnition of a
Construct and Charge rule for mcst situations is given in Section 4, together
with some examples and properties for such rules. In Section 5 the connec-
tion with Obligation rules is studied. A value-theoretic approach is provided
in Section 6 using sharing values for cost games. Section 7 concludes.
2 Preliminaries and notations
An (undirected) graph is a pair < V;E >, where V is a set of vertices or
nodes and E is a set of edges e of the form fi;jg with i;j 2 V , i 6= j.
The complete graph on a set V of vertices is the graph < V;EV >, where
EV = ffi;jgji;j 2 V and i 6= jg. A path between i and j in a graph < V;E >
is a sequence of nodes i = i0;i1;:::;ik = j, k ¸ 1, such that fis;is+1g 2 E for
each s 2 f0;:::;k ¡1g. A cycle in < V;E > is a path with all distinct edges
from i to i for some i 2 V . Two nodes i;j 2 V are connected in < V;E > if
i = j or if there exists a path between i and j in E. A connected component
of V in < V;E > is a maximal subset of V with the property that any two
nodes in this subset are connected in < V;E >.
Now, we consider minimum cost spanning tree (mcst) situations. In an
3mcst situation a set N = f1;:::;ng of agents is involved willing to be con-
nected as cheap as possible to a source (i.e. a supplier of a service) denoted
by 0. In the sequel we use the notation N0 = N [f0g. An mcst situation can
be represented by a tuple < N0;EN0;w >, where < N0;EN0 > is the complete
graph on the set N0 of nodes or vertices, and w : EN0 ! I R+ is a map which
assigns to each edge e 2 EN0 a nonnegative number w(e) representing the
weight or cost of edge e. We call w a weight function.
Since in our paper the graph of possible edges is always the complete
graph, we simply denote an mcst situation with set of users N, source 0,
and weight function w by < N0;w >. Often we identify an mcst situation
< N0;w > with the corresponding weight function w. We denote by WN0 the
set of all mcst situations < N0;w > (or w) with node set N0. For each S µ N,
one can consider the mcst subsituation < S0;wjS0 >, where S0 = S [f0g and
wjS0 : ES0 ! I R+ is the restriction of the weight function w to ES0 µ EN0,
i.e. wjS0(e) = w(e) for each e 2 ES0.
Let < N0;w > be an mcst situation. Two nodes i and j are called (w;N0)-
connected if i = j or if there exists a sequence of nodes i = i0;:::;ik = j in
N0, k ¸ 1, with w(fis;is+1g) = 0 for every s 2 f0;:::;k ¡ 1g. A (w;N0)-
component of N0 is a maximal subset of N0 with the property that any two
nodes in this subset are (w;N0)-connected. We denote by Mi(w) the (w;N0)-
component to which i belongs and by M(w) the set of all (w;N0)-components
of N0. Clearly, the collection of (w;N0)-components forms a partition of N0.
We deﬁne the set ΣEN0 of linear orders on EN0 as the set of all bijections
¾ : f1;:::;jEN0jg ! EN0, where jEN0j is the cardinality of the set EN0. For
each mcst situation < N0;w > there exists at least one linear order ¾ 2 ΣEN0





For any ¾ 2 ΣEN0 we deﬁne the set
K
¾ = fw 2 I R
EN0
+ j w(¾(1)) · w(¾(2)) · ::: · w(¾(jEN0j))g:
The set K¾ is a cone in I R
EN0
+ , which we call the Kruskal cone with respect
to ¾. One can easily see that
S
¾2ΣEN0 K¾ = I R
EN0
+ . For each ¾ 2 ΣEN0 the
4cone K¾ is a simplicial cone with generators e¾;k 2 K¾, k 2 f1;2;:::;jEN0jg,
where
e¾;k(¾(1)) = e¾;k(¾(2)) = ::: = e¾;k(¾(k ¡ 1)) = 0
and
e¾;k(¾(k)) = e¾;k(¾(k + 1)) = ::: = e¾;k(¾(jEN0j)) = 1
(1)
[Note that e¾;1(¾(k)) = 1 for all k 2 f1;2;:::;jEN0jg].
This implies that each w 2 K¾ can be written in a unique way as non-
negative linear combination of these generators. To be more concrete, for










Any mcst situation gives rise to two problems: the construction of a
network Γ µ EN0 of minimal cost connecting all users to the source, and a
cost sharing problem of distributing this cost in a fair way among users. The
cost of a network Γ is w(Γ) =
P
e2Γ w(e). A network Γ is a spanning network
on S0 µ N0 if for every e 2 Γ we have e 2 ES0 and for every i 2 S there is a
path in Γ from i to the source.
Now, we recall the deﬁnition of a minimal mcst situation given in Tijs
et al. (2005). Let w 2 WN0. For each path P = (i0;i1;:::;ik) from i to j
in the graph < N0;EN0 > we denote the set of its edges by E(P), that is
E(P) = ffi0;i1g;fi1;i2g;:::;fik¡1;ikgg. Moreover, we call maxe2E(P) w(e)
the top of the path P and denote it by t(P). We denote by PN0
ij the set of
all paths without cycles from i to j in the graph < N0;EN0 >. The minimal










for each i;j 2 N0, i 6= j.
Next we introduce some basic game theoretical notations. A cooperative
cost game or cost game is a pair (N;c), where N denotes the ﬁnite set of
players and c : 2N ! I R the characteristic function, with c(;) = 0 (here 2N
5denotes the power set of player set N). Often we identify a cost game (N;c)
with the corresponding characteristic function c. A group of players T µ N
is called a coalition and c(T) is called the cost of this coalition. The class of
all cost games with N as set of players is denoted by GN
Let < N0;w > be an mcst situation. The minimum cost spanning tree
game (N;cw) (or simply cw), corresponding to < N0;w >, is deﬁned by
cw(S) = minfw(Γ)jΓ is a spanning network on S
0g
for every S 2 2Nnf;g, with the convention that cw(;) = 0.
The dual unanimity game (N;u¤
R) on R µ N is the game described by
uR(T) = 1 if R \ T 6= ; and uR(T) = 0, otherwise. Every cost game (N;c)
can be written as a linear combination of dual unanimity games in a unique
way, i.e. c =
P
SµN;S6=; ®S(c)u¤
S. So, these dual unanimity games form a
basis of the linear space GN. The coeﬃcients (®S(v))S22Nnf;g are called dual
unanimity coeﬃcients of the cost game (N;c).
Let HN µ GN. We call a map Ã : HN ! I RN assigning to every cost game
(N;c) 2 HN a unique cost allocation in I RN a value. A value Ã is eﬃcient
if we have
P
i2N Ãi(c) = c(N) for each c 2 GN. A value Ã : HN ! I RN is
called linear if Ã(¯v+°u) = ¯Ã(v)+°Ã(u) for all games v;u 2 HN and real
numbers ¯;° 2 I R such that ¯v + °u 2 HN.
We call a map F : WN0 ! I RN assigning to every mcst situation w a
unique cost allocation in I RN a solution. A solution F is a cost monotonic
solution if for all mcst situations w; ¯ w 2 WN0 such that w(¯ e) · ¯ w(¯ e) for
one edge ¯ e 2 EN0 and w(e) = ¯ w(e) for each e 2 EN0 n f¯ eg, it holds that
F(w) · F( ¯ w).
The most famous value in the theory of cost games is the Shapley value,
introduced by Shapley (1953). This value can be described in several ways.
In view of the considerations presented in Section 7, we introduce the Shap-
ley value Á applied to game (N;c) 2 GN in terms of the dual unanimity







6Finally, a particular set, possibly empty, of allocations of a cost game
(N;c) is the core, which is deﬁned as follows:









3 Conservative charge systems
To introduce the deﬁnition of a charge system we need some additional no-
tations. Let N = f1;:::;jNjg and ∆(N) = fx 2 I RN
+j
P
i2N xi = 1g. We




N0 = f(a1;:::;ajNj) 2
jNj Y
i=1
EN0jfa1;:::;ajNjg is a spanning networkg:
Given an element a = (a1;:::;ajNj) 2
QjNj
i=1 EN0, we denote by ajj the re-
striction of a to the ﬁrst j components, that is ajj = (a1;:::;aj) for each
j 2 f1;:::;jNjg.
Further, for each j 2 f1;:::;jNjg, we denote by Π(ajj) the partition of
N0 such that
Π(ajj) = fT µ N
0jT is a connected component in < N
0;fa1;:::;ajg >g;
for each a = (a1;:::;ajNj) 2 E
jNj
N0 .
Now, let µ 2 Θ(N0), where Θ(N0) is the family of partitions of N0 and let
T µ N0. We denote by S(µ;T) the unique element of µ, if any, of which T is
a subset.
Deﬁnition 1 A charge system C on N is a set of functions C = fC1;:::;CjNjg
with Cj : fajj : a 2 E
jNj




i(ajj) = 0 for each i 2 S(Π(ajj¡1);f0g);
each j 2 f1;:::;jNjg;





i(ajj) = 0 for each i 2 N n S(Π(ajj);aj)
each j 2 f1;:::;jNjg;







i(ajj) = 1 for each i 2 N;
and each a = (a1;:::;ajNj) 2 E
jNj
N0 :
Summing up, each element a 2 E
jNj
N0 tells the “history” of the spanning
network formation, that is adding the edge aj to the already formed graph
ajj¡1, for each j 2 f1;:::;jNjg (note that when the ﬁrst edge a1 is formed,
the already formed graph is < N0;; >. So Π(aj0) is the singleton partition
of N0.).
As it will be explained in more detail in the next section, a charge system
speciﬁes how to allocate fractions of the edge aj, for each j 2 f1;:::;jNjg,
according to the three properties in Deﬁnition 1 in the spanning network
corresponding to a 2 E
jNj
N0 . The connection property says that agents already
connected to the source in ajj¡1 should not be charged anymore. The in-
volvement property says that only agents who are connected to nodes in aj
in the graph ajj (i.e. involved agents in forming aj) should be charged with
fractions of aj. The total aggregation property says that when the construc-
tion of the spanning network corresponding to a is completed, each agent
has been charged for a total amount of fractions equal to 1.
The charge systems in Examples 1-4 will play a role in Section 4 to deﬁne
special construct and charge rules. Let a 2 E
jNj
N0 . Brieﬂy, the charge system
of Example 1 charges the involved agents in forming the edge aj, for each
j 2 f1;:::;jNjg, taking into account the cardinality of their connected com-
ponents in the graphs ajj¡1 and ajj; the charge system of Example 2 charges
the involved agents in forming the edge aj, for each j 2 f1;:::;jNjg, pro-
portionally to the fractions charged for some previously formed edges; the
8charge system of Example 3 charges uniquely one involved agent each time an
edge aj is formed, for each j 2 f1;:::;jNjg; the intuition behind the charge
system of Example 4 is to charge equally the involved agents in the same
connected component in ajj, for each j 2 f1;:::;jNjg, keeping into account
the constraint given by the total aggregation property .
Example 1 Consider the charge system ˆ C = f ˆ C1;:::; ˆ CjNjg on N such that
for each a = (a1;:::;ajNj) 2 E
jNj





> > > > > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > > > > :
1
jS(Π(ajj¡1);fig)j ¡ 1
jS(Π(ajj);fig)j if f0;ig \ S(Π(ajj);aj) = fig;
1
jS(Π(ajj¡1);fig)j if f0;ig \ S(Π(ajj);aj) = f0;ig
and f0g \ S(Π(ajj¡1);fig) = ;;
0 otherwise;
for each i 2 N. One can easily check that the functions ˆ C1;:::; ˆ CjNj take
values in ∆(N).
Example 2 Consider the charge system ˜ C = f ˜ C1;:::; ˜ CjNjg on N such that
for each a = (a1;:::;ajNj) 2 E
jNj





> > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > :
1
2 if f0;ig \ S(Π(aj1);a1) = fig;
1 if f0;ig \ S(Π(aj1);a1) = f0;ig;
0 otherwise;
(5)





> > > > > > > <




















i(ajl) if S(Π(ajj¡1);fig) 6= fig;
1 otherwise:
(7)
We prove by induction to j that the function ˜ Cj, j 2 f1;:::;jNjg, takes
values in ∆(N).
If j = 1 it is easy to check in relation (5) that ˜ C1 takes values in ∆(N).
Now let j 2 f2;:::;jNjg and suppose that ˜ Cl takes values in ∆(N) for
every l 2 f1;:::;j ¡ 1g. Let a = (a1;:::;ajNj) 2 E
jNj
N0 . We distinguish two
cases.
The ﬁrst case is 0 = 2 S(Π(ajj);aj). Then there exist s;t 2 f1;:::;j ¡ 1g
such that S(Π(ajs);as) [ S(Π(ajt);at) = S(Π(ajj);aj) and S(Π(ajs);as) \
S(Π(ajt);at) = ;. Moreover, by relation (6) ˜ Cv
i (ajv) = 0 for each i 2
S(Π(ajs);as) and each v 2 fs + 1;:::;j ¡ 1g; and ˜ Cw
i (ajw) = 0 for each










i (ajs) = 1 (8)
where the ﬁrst equality follows from relation (7) and the second equality from










i(ajt) = 1 (9)


















































= jS(Π(ajj);aj) n f0gj ¡
¡
jS(Π(ajj);aj) n f0gj ¡ 1
¢
= 1;
10where the ﬁrst equality follows from the involvement property of ˜ C, the second
equality from relation (6) and the fourth equality follows from the fact that to
connect nodes in S(Π(ajj);aj) are needed jS(Π(ajj);aj)j edges and on stages
from 1 to j¡1 precisely jS(Π(ajj), aj)j¡1 edges have been already constructed
and, by the induction hypothesis and relation (6), totally divided among some
nodes in S(Π(ajj);aj).
Since in both cases it is evident that ˜ Cj takes values in I RN
+, for each
j 2 f1;:::;jNjg, we conclude that ˜ C1;:::; ˜ CjNj take values in ∆(N).
Example 3 Given a bijection ¿ : N ! f1;2;:::;jNjg, let the charge system
C¿ = fC¿;1;:::;C¿;jNjg on N be such that for each a = (a1;:::;ajNj) 2 E
jNj
N0







1 if ¿(i) = maxf¿(k)jk 2 S(Π(aj1);a1) n f0gg;
0 otherwise;





> > > > <
> > > > :





k (ajl) 6= 1g;
0 otherwise:
To prove that the functions C¿;1;:::;C¿;jNj take values in ∆(N) is left to the
reader.
Example 4 Consider the charge system ˇ C = f ˇ C1;:::; ˇ CjNjg on N such that
for each a = (a1;:::;ajNj) 2 E
jNj





> > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > :
1
2 if f0;ig \ S(Π(aj1);a1) = fig;
1 if f0;ig \ S(Π(aj1);a1) = f0;ig;
0 otherwise;










i (ajk);®g if i 2 S(Π(ajj);aj);
0 otherwise:








i (ajk);®g = 1: (11)
From relation (11) it directly follows that the functions ˇ C1;:::; ˇ CjNj take
values in ∆(N).
Remark 1 We leave for the reader the straightforwardly exercise to prove
that ˆ C; ˜ C;C¿, where ¿ 2 ΣN (ΣN is the set of all bijections ¿ : N !
f1;:::;jNjg), and ˇ C on N are indeed charge systems, i.e. all satisfy the con-
nection property, the involvement property and the total aggregation property.
In this paper, special charge systems, which we call conservative, will play
a role. Consider a charge system C = fC1;:::;CjNjg on N. We deﬁne the
aggregate contribution of the charge system C on ajj, for each j 2 f1;:::;jNjg
and for each a = (a1;:::;ajNj) 2 E
jNj
N0 , as the jNj-vector AC(ajj) calculated







Deﬁnition 2 Let C = fC1;:::;CjNjg be a charge system on N. We call
C a conservative charge system if for all j 2 f1;:::;jNjg and for each pair
a;b 2 E
jNj




The peculiarity of conservative charge systems is that they preserve the ag-
gregate contribution from the network construction history, i.e. the aggregate
12contribution corresponding to ajj, for a 2 E
jNj
N0 and j 2 f1;:::;jNjg, is only
dependent on the partition of N0 induced by the connected components in
< N0;fa1;:::;ajg >.
The proof of the following lemma is straightforward.
Lemma 1 Let C = fC1;:::;CjNjg be a conservative charge system on N
and let S µ N0. Let a = (a1;:::;ajNj);b = (b1;:::;bjNj) 2 E
jNj
N0 be such that




We denote by P C(S) 2 I RN
+ the unique aggregate charge corresponding to
the partition fS;figi2N0nSg for some S 2 2N0 nf;g and call it the potential of
S w.r.t. the conservative charge system C. The name potential is inspired by
physics where each conservative vector ﬁeld has a potential. In a connection
situation, an intuitive interpretation of the potential P C(S), S 2 2N0 nf;g, is
as the level of “connection work” done by nodes in N when fS;figi2N0nSg is
the current set of connected components and the conservative charge system
C is used. At the beginning of the connection process, when no edges are
formed and all the connected components are singletons, the level of con-
nection work performed by nodes should be zero. From this the convention
that P C
i (fjg) = P C
i (f0g) = 0 for all i;j 2 N. Other elementary properties of
P C : 2N0 n f;g ! I RN
+ are collected in the following lemma:
Lemma 2 Let C = fC1;:::;CjNjg be a conservative charge system on N
and let S 2 2N0 n f;g. Let P C be the potential w.r.t. C. Then
(c.1) if 0 2 S then P C(S) = eSnf0g;







i (S) = jSj ¡ 1;
(c.3) if S µ T µ N0, then P C(S) · P C(T).
[Here eSnf0g 2 I RN
+ is such that e
Snf0g
i = 1 for each i 2 S nf0g and e
Snf0g
i = 0
for each i 2 N n S.]
13Proof
(c.1) Let a = (a1;:::;ajNj) 2 E
jNj
N0 and j 2 f1;:::;jNjg be such that Π(ajj) =
fS;figi2N0nSg. Then, for each i 2 N \ S
P C




i (ajk) = 1 ¡
PjNj
k=j+1 Ck
i (ajk) = 1;
where the third equality follows from the total aggregation property of
C and the fourth equality follows from the connection property of C.
From the involvement property, we have P C
i (S) = 0 for each i 2 N nS,
which ﬁnally proves property (c.1).
(c.2) If 0 2 S then condition (c.2) follows directly from condition (c.1).
Now consider the case 0 = 2 S. Let a = (a1;:::;ajNj) 2 E
jNj
N0 and j 2
f1;:::;jNjg be such that Π(ajj) = fS;figi2N0nSg. First note that since



















k=1 1 = jSj ¡ 1;
where the fourth equality follows from Deﬁnition 1. By the involvement
property it follows that P C
i (S) = 0 for each i 2 N n S, which ﬁnally
proves property (c.2).
(c.3) Let a = (a1;:::;ajNj) 2 E
jNj
N0 and j;l 2 f1;:::;jNjg with l ¸ j be such
that Π(ajj) = fS;figi2N0nSg and Π(ajl) = fT;figi2N0nTg. Then,










k=1 Ck(ajk) = AC(ajl) = P C(T);
which concludes the proof of property (c.3).
14Proposition 1 Let C = fC1;:::;CjNjg be a conservative charge system on
N. Let a = (a1;:::;ajNj) 2 E
jNj
N0 and j 2 f1;:::;jNjg be such that Π(ajj) =







Proof Let r 2 f1;2;:::;mg. Determine br(1);:::;br(pr) 2 f1;:::;jg such
that Π(abr(1);abr(2);:::; abr(pr)) = fSr;figi2N0nSrg where pr = jSrj ¡ 1.
Then for each i 2 N n Sr, by the involvement property of C
P
C
i (Sr) = A
C
i (abr(1);abr(2);:::;abr(pr)) = 0
whereas for each i 2 N \ Sr
P C





i (a1;a2;:::;aj) = AC
i (ajj);
where the second equality follows from the involvement property in the edge
sequence (abr(1);abr(2);:::;abr(j)) and the third equality follows from the fact
that C is conservative. Consequently,
Pm
r=1 P C(Sr) = AC(ajj).
4 Construct and charge rules for mcst situa-
tions
Let w 2 WN0 and let ¾ 2 ΣEN0 be such that w 2 K¾. We can consider
a sequence of precisely jEN0j + 1 graphs < N0;F ¾;0 >;< N0;F ¾;1 >;:::;
< N0;F ¾;jEN0j > such that F ¾;0 = ;, F ¾;k = F ¾;k¡1 [ f¾(k)g for each
k 2 f1;:::;jEN0jg. For each graph < N0;F ¾;k >, with k 2 f0;1;:::;jEN0jg,
let ¼¾;k be the partition of N [ f0g consisting of the connected components
of N0 in < N0;F ¾;k >.
Remark 2 For each k 2 f1;:::;jEN0jg, ¼¾;k is either equal to ¼¾;k¡1 or
obtained from ¼¾;k¡1 by forming the union of two elements of ¼¾;k¡1.
15Now we deﬁne recursively a function ½¾ : f0;1;:::;jNjg ! f0;1;:::;jEN0jg
by
² ½¾(0) = 0
² ½¾(j) = minfk 2 f½¾(j ¡ 1) + 1;:::;jEN0jgj¼¾;k 6= ¼¾;½¾(j¡1)g
for each j 2 f1;:::;jNjg.
Note that ¼¾;½¾(i) 6= ¼¾;½¾(j) for each i;j 2 f0;1;:::;jNjg with i 6= j,
and ¾(½¾(1));:::;¾(½¾(jNj)) corresponds to the jNj accepted edges in the
Kruskal procedure based on the ordering ¾.
Example 5 Consider the mcst situation < N0;w > with N0 = f0;1;2;3g
and w as depicted in Figure 1. Note that w 2 K¾, with ¾(1) = f1;2g,































Figure 1: An mcst situation with three agents.
The sequence of seven graphs < N0;F ¾;k > and the corresponding se-
quence of partitions ¼¾;k are shown in the following table





4 ff1;2g;f1;3g;f2;3g;f1;0gg fN [ f0gg
5 ff1;2g;f1;3g;f2;3g;f1;0g;f2;0gg fN [ f0gg
6 ff1;2g;f1;3g;f2;3g;f1;0g;f2;0g;f3;0gg fN [ f0gg
16Then ½¾(0) = 0, ½¾(1) = 1, ½¾(2) = 2, ½¾(3) = 4.
Deﬁnition 3 Let C = fC1;:::;CjNjg be a charge system on N. Let ¾ 2
ΣEN0. The Construct & Charge (CC-)rule w.r.t. C and ¾ is the map F C;¾ :










for each mcst situation w in the cone K¾.
Remark 3 CC-rules F C;¾ where C is a conservative charge system are called
conservative CC-rules.
Deﬁnition 4 Let C = fC1;:::;CjNjg be a charge system on N. We say that




for each w in the cone K¾1 \ K¾2.





where w 2 WN0 and ¾ 2 ΣEN0 is such that w 2 K¾.
Remark 4 The P-value (Branzei et al. (2004), Feltkamp et al. (1994b))
and the P ¿-values, with ¿ 2 ΣN, introduced in Norde et al. (2004) and
studied in Branzei et al. (2004), are CC-rules whose charge systems have
the patch property, as proved in Tijs et al.(2005). In fact F
ˆ C(w) = P(w),
where ˆ C is the charge system of Example 1, and F C¿(w) = P ¿(w) for each
¿ 2 ΣN, where C¿ is the charge system of Example 3. Moreover, for all
¾ 2 ΣEN0, the CC-rule F
˜ C;¾, where ˜ C is the charge system of Example 2,
corresponds to the Proportional rule introduced in Feltkamp et al.(1994a).
17Example 6 Consider the mcst situation < N0;w > with N0 = f0;1;2;3g
and w as depicted in Figure 1. Let ¾ be as in Example 5 and ¾0(1) = f1;3g,
¾0(2) = f1;2g, ¾0(3) = f2;3g, ¾0(4) = f1;0g, ¾0(5) = f2;0g, ¾0(6) = f3;0g.
- The charge system ˆ C of Example 1 leads to
F




- The charge system ˜ C of Example 2 leads to
F


























- The charge system ˇ C of Example 4 leads to
F







Theorem 1 Let C = fC1;:::;CjNjg be a charge system on N. If C has the
patch property, then C is conservative.
Proof Suppose C is not conservative. Then we can ﬁnd a j 2 f1;:::;jNjg
and a pair a = (a1;:::;ajNj);b = (b1;:::;bjNj) 2 E
jNj
N0 ; with Π(ajj) = Π(bjj)
and AC(ajj) 6= AC(bjj):





0 if there exists r 2 f1;:::;mg s.t. i;j 2 Sr;
1 otherwise;
18for each fi;jg 2 EN0. Let ¾1 2 ΣEN0 be such that ¾1(½¾1(k)) = ak for




Let ¾2 2 ΣEN0 be such that ¾2(½¾2(k)) = bk for each k 2 f1;:::;jg and

















= eN ¡ AC(ajj):











So, F C;¾1(w) 6= F C;¾2(w), which yields a contradiction with the fact that
C has the patch property.
Remark 5 From Theorem 1 and Remark 3 we conclude that the P-value
and the P ¿-values with ¿ 2 ΣN are conservative CC-rules.
5 Conservative CC-rules are cost monotonic
solutions
The main result in this section is derived from the relation between Obligation
rules (Tijs et al. (2004)) and conservative CC-rules.
We ﬁrst recall some deﬁnitions from Tijs et al. (2004). A function o :
2Nnf;g ! I RN
+ is called an obligation function if the following two properties
hold for each S 2 2N n f;g:
19o.1) o(S) 2 ∆(S),
o.2) for each T 2 2N n f;g with S µ T: oi(S) ¸ oi(T) for all i 2 S,
where the sub-simplex ∆(S) of ∆(N) = fx 2 I RN
+j
P
i2N xi = 1g is given by
∆(S) = fx 2 ∆(N)j
P
i2S xi = 1g.
Given an obligation function o, the obligation map ˆ o : Θ(N0) ! I RN is
deﬁned by ˆ o(µ) =
P
S2µ;0= 2S o(S) for each µ 2 Θ(N0).
Let ˆ o be an obligation map on Θ(N0) and let ¾ 2 ΣEN0. The map Á¾;ˆ o :

























is used in Tijs et al. (2004) to prove that
Á
ˆ o(w) := Á
¾;ˆ o(w) = Á
¾0;ˆ o(w) (17)
for all w 2 K¾ \K¾0 (patch property), leading to the deﬁnition of Obligation
rule as the map Áˆ o : WN0 ! I RN.
Other interesting properties for such maps, proved in Tijs et al. (2004),
are collected in the next theorem.
Theorem 2 Let w 2 WN0. Let ˆ o be an obligation map on Θ(N0). The
following properties hold for the Obligation rule Áˆ o : WN0 ! I RN
i) (cost monotonicity) Áˆ o is a cost monotonic solution for mcst situations;
ii) (stability) Áˆ o(w) belongs to the core of the cost game (N;cw) for every
w 2 WN0.
In the following theorem, we relate conservative charge systems and CC-rules
with obligation functions and Obligation rules.
20Theorem 3 Let C = fC1;:::;CjNjg be a conservative charge system on N
and let P C(S) be the potential of S with respect to the conservative charge









1 ¡ P C
i (S) if i 2 S;
0 if i = 2 S;
(18)
for each i 2 N and for each S 2 2N n f;g. Then,
i) oC is an obligation function;
ii) Áˆ oC(w) = F C;¾(w) = F C;¾0(w) for all ¾;¾0 2 ΣEN0 and w 2 K¾ \ K¾0,
i.e. C has the patch property.
Proof
i) We have to prove that for oC the properties o:1 and o:2 hold.
By deﬁnition it follows directly that oC
i (S) = 0 for each i 2 N n S and
oC
i (S) ¸ 0 for each i 2 S and for each S 2 2N n f;g. Moreover, from










i (S) = jSj ¡ (jSj ¡ 1) = 1;
for each S 2 2N n f;g, implying that condition (o.1) holds.
Finally, by condition (c.3), we have that for each i 2 S µ T µ N
o
C
i (S) = 1 ¡ P
C
i (S) ¸ 1 ¡ P
C
i (T) = o
C
i (T) (19)
for each S 2 2N n f;g and for each i 2 S, which proves that condition
(o.2) holds too.








































r=1 w(¾(½¾(r)))Cr(½¾(1));:::;¾(½¾(r)) = F C;¾(w):
(20)
where the third equality follows from relation (18) and the fourth one
from the deﬁnition of potential. Now the proof of ii) follows directly
from i) and relations (17) and (20) on the obligation rule Áˆ oC.
The next theorem which follows from Theorems 1 and 3 is our main result
in this section.
Theorem 4 For each charge system C = fC1;:::;CjNjg on N the following
statements are equivalent:
i) C is a conservative charge system;
ii) C has the patch property;
iii) the CC-rule w.r.t. to C is an Obligation rule.
From Theorems 2 and 4 we conclude that conservative CC-rules are stable
and cost monotonic solutions for mcst situations.
6 Conservative CC-rules and sharing values
for cost games
In this section the set of Obligation rules, and consequently the set of con-
servative CC-rules, will be considered from a value-theoretic point of view.
22A sharing system is a map q : 2N n f;g ! I RN
+ such that q(S) 2 ∆(S) ,
for every nonempty coalition S.








for every c 2 GN, every i 2 N and where ®S(c) for each S 2 2N n f;g is
the dual unanimity coeﬃcient. In particular, with every obligation function
o one can associate a special sharing value mo.
The following lemmas are helpful in relating sharing values with Obliga-
tion rules.
Lemma 3 Let w 2 WN0 and let ¾ 2 ΣEN0 be such that w 2 K¾. Then




w(¾(k)) ¡ w(¾(k ¡ 1))
¢
e¾;k;




w(¾(k)) ¡ w(¾(k ¡ 1))
¢
ce¾;k.
Proof The proof directly follows from relation (2) and by Proposition 6 in
Tijs et al. (2005).
The core of the game cw is a reﬁnement of the core of the game cw and
has been characterized in Tijs et al. (2005) via monotonicity and additivity
properties.
Let o be an obligation function and let ˆ o be the corresponding obligation
map on Θ(N0). From relation (2) and the deﬁnition of Obligation rule in
Tijs et al. (2004) it follows that an alternative way of calculating Áˆ o(w) for
each w 2 WN0 as linear combination of Áˆ o(e¾;k), k 2 f1;:::;jEN0jg, where
¾ 2 ΣEN0 is such that w 2 K¾, will be useful in the following. In formula,




w(¾(k)) ¡ w(¾(k ¡ 1))
¢
Áˆ o(e¾;k): (22)





ˆ o(¼¾;r¡1) ¡ ˆ o(¼¾;r)
¢
= ˆ o(¼¾;k) =
P
V 2¼¾;k:0= 2V o(V ):
(23)
23Recall also that in Tijs et al. (2005) (see their Proposition 5 and Remark 5)
it has been proved that
Á
ˆ o(w) = Á
ˆ o( ¯ w) (24)
for every w 2 WN0.
Now, we can introduce the following lemma.
Lemma 4 Let ¾ 2 ΣEN0 and let e¾;k 2 K¾, k 2 f1;:::;jEN0jg. Let ˆ o be an
obligation map on Θ(N0). Then
i) ce¾;k =
P
V 2¼¾;k:0= 2V u¤
V;
ii) mo(ce¾;k) = Áˆ o(e¾;k).
Proof First note that e¾;k 2 K¾ (see Lemma 2 in Tijs et al. (2005)).
i) follows from the fact that for each S 2 2N n f;g,
ce¾;k(S) = jfV : V is a (e¾;k;N
0) ¡ component;V \ S 6= ;;0 = 2 V gj;
where the (e¾;k;N0)-components are precisely the elements of the par-
tition ¼¾;k;
ii) From i) and the linearity of mo it follows that
mo(ce¾;k) = mo(
P








V 2¼¾;k:0= 2V o(V ) = Áˆ o(e¾;k);
(25)
where the ﬁrst equality follows by point i), the second equality follows
from linearity of mo, the third equality follows from relation (21) and
the last equality follows from relations (23) and (24).
Now, we are able to prove the main result of this section.
Theorem 5 Let w 2 WN0 and let ¾ 2 ΣEN0 be such that w 2 K¾. Let ˆ o be










w(¾(k)) ¡ w(¾(k ¡ 1))
¢
mo(ce¾;k)




w(¾(k)) ¡ w(¾(k ¡ 1))
¢
Áˆ o(e¾;k)
= Áˆ o( ¯ w);
where the ﬁrst equality follows from Lemma 3.ii and the linearity of mo, the
second equality from Lemma 4.ii and the third equality follows from relation
(22).
Corollary 1 1 The P-value on w equals the Shapley value on cw.
Proof Consider the charge system of Example 1. As we already said in
Remark 5, such a charge system leads to a conservative CC-rule which cor-
responds to the P-value (Branzei et al.(2004)). The obligation function o¤
obtained from the charge system of Example 1 via relation (18) is such that
o¤(S) = eS
jSj for each S 2 2N n f;g (see also Example 1 in Tijs et al. (2004)),
where eS is the jNj-vector such that eS
i = 1 if i 2 S and eS
i = 0 if i 2 N n S.
Then, directly from relation (4) it follows that mo¤(cw) is the Shapley value
of the game cw.
7 Final Remarks
This paper deals with Construct and Charge rules for mcst situations based
on the Kruskal algorithm.
The Prim algorithm (Prim (1957)) also generates a sequence of edges
which form an mcst. In the ﬁrst step an edge of minimal cost between a
node in N and the source 0 is formed. In every subsequent step an edge
1In Berga˜ ntinos and Vidal-Puga (2004) this result has also been proved in a diﬀerent
way.
25of minimal cost between a node in N which is not connected yet with the
source (directly or indirectly) and a node in N which is already connected
with the source is formed. In every step of the algorithm there is precisely
one node in N which gets a connection with the source, so the algorithm
also stops after precisely n steps. C.G.Bird (1976) proposes a way to share
the costs of each edge constructed via the Prim algorithm where each agent
pays the ﬁrst edge in which he is involved. This situation can also be seen as
a construct and charge protocol, where an mcst tree is constructed edge by
edge and where one of the players (the player who is just connected with the
source) pays the edge just constructed. For more information on this rule
see Feltkamp (1995).
Since we were interested in linearity properties of the construct and charge
protocols with respect to mcst situations with the same orderings of the cost
of the edges, we have focused our analysis only on construct and charge
protocols based on the Kruskal algorithm.
Finally, note that in view of Theorem 4, Obligation rules on mcst situa-
tions can be seen as weighted Shapley values (Kalai and Samet (1987); see
also Derks et al. (2000)) of the corresponding mcst games.
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